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[201] 
Police Terror and Officer Indemnification 
ALLYSSA VILLANUEVA* 
Introduction 
On May 6, 2012, Oakland Police Officers Miguel Masso and 
Joseph Fesmire initiated a stop of Alan Bluford and two friends in 
Oakland, CA.1  The facts are disputed but the altercation escalated 
resulting in Bluford sustaining three fatal gunshot wounds from 
Officer Masso.2  Bluford was an 18-year-old high school senior.3  No 
weapons were found on Bluford and witnesses stated he was not a 
threat to anyone around.4  In July of 2012, Bluford’s mother filed suit 
in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her 
son’s civil rights against the Oakland Police Department and the 
individual officers involved.5  In June of 2014, the case settled with an 
award agreement in the amount of $110,000 to Bluford’s family and 
was approved by the Oakland City Council.6 
These homicides are portrayed as aberrations from routine 
 
 * J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 
2016.  Thank you to U.C. Hastings Professor Osagie Obasogie and to the Hastings Race 
and Poverty Law Journal.  
1.  Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. 12-CV-0379-WHO, 2014 WL939939, at *1 
 *N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Alan Bluford FAQ, JUSTICE4ALANBLUEFORD.ORG (Nov. 12, 2012), http://justice4
alanblueford.org/2012/11/12/alan-blueford-faq/. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Complaint for Damages for Violations of Civil Rights and Wrongful Death, 
Bluford v. City of Oakland, No. C12-03791 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2012). 
6.  Family of Teen Killed by Oakland Police Receives $110k Settlement, ABC 7 NEWS 
(June 4, 2014), http://abc7news.com/news/family-of-teen-killed-by-oakland-police-
receives-$110k-settlement/94178/. 
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policing and as rare “accidents.”7  However, this atomized focus 
on each single event transforms them into a spectacle and it is the 
job of the spectacular to draw attention away from the banality of 
police murder as standard operating procedure.8  The 
spectacularized event of murder by police is actually routine.9  Police 
power is unique because it is the government’s central grant of 
authority to use physical repression and violence against citizens.10  
This includes implied power over life and death.11  Police actions must 
be reviewed because a unique aspect of their power is the ability to 
use lethal force against unarmed citizens.12  Even if there were no 
demonstrable pattern of police malpractice, the experience of 
American history suggests that safeguards must be constructed 
against any grant of state power as large as that given to the police.13 
Critical Race Theory (“CRT”) was founded as a critique of the 
law as an institution complicit in the creation and sustenance of 
racism, discrimination, and other forms of societal inequality.14  
This Note offers a critique of indemnification law specifically, and 
§ 1983 generally, as the main civil cause of action for homicides 
committed by police in the line of duty.  Furthermore, CRT 
provides an analytical framework to assess the current economy of 
 
7.  Steve Martinot & Jared Sexton, The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy, 9 SOCIAL 
IDENTITIES: J. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE, NATION, & CULTURE 2, 6 (2003). 
8.  Id. 
9.  Reported data shows that officers have killed 600-800 people every year in the 
past decade, which suggests a routine, if not daily, occurrence.  ANDREA M. BURCH, 
2003-2009 Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS 4 at 
T1 (2011). 
10.  Government police power is the general power to infringe on individual 
liberty to serve the public welfare.  See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 
(1962).  
11.  ZENITH GROSS, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD 4 (ACLU ed., 1966); Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 
PUBLIC CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby Mientjes, 2003). 
12.  Id. at 4. 
13.  Id. at 14. 
14. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii-
xiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995). 
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police violence, its historical trajectory, and legal structuring 
through a racial lens. 
Before attending law school, I completed an undergraduate 
honors thesis entitled “Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the 
United States.”15  That thesis examined the issue of officer-involved 
homicides through a Black Studies and Ethnic Studies framework.  
The scope of this Note is limited to lethal police violence as it becomes 
subject to § 1983 litigation through a Critical Race Theory lens.  The 
Note focuses specifically on § 1983 civil suits and the doctrine of 
indemnification; it will not include any discussion of potential 
criminal liability or nonlethal forms of police use of force. 
Often, the only direct consequences for officers comes internally 
from their department or the locality they serve.16  These commonly 
include: paid administrative leave, work suspension, negative reports 
in their file, job transfer, and other disciplinary measures.  Many civil 
rights laws rely heavily on the assumption that police officers pay 
judgments and settlements out of their own pockets.17  However, most 
officers do not.18  The court’s jurisprudence prohibiting municipal 
liability for punitive damages was designed to protect taxpayers from 
bearing the costs of officer misconduct.19  However, recent studies 
reveal that taxpayers almost always satisfy both compensatory and 
punitive damage awards assessed against their sworn servants.20  This 
cost shifting effectively undercuts any liability potentially imposed on 
 
15.  Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Anti-Black Genocide in the United 
States (June 13, 2012) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, U.C. San Diego) (on file with 
the Ethnic Studies Department, U.C. San Diego). 
16.  There is no comprehensive tracking of discipline and punishment rates of 
officers who use excessive force.  This is due in part to the lack of mandated reporting 
and to the fact that many aspects of personnel decisions are not available for public 
disclosure.  For officers’ thoughts and experiences with discipline, see DAVID 
WEISBURD ET AL., THE POLICE FOUNDATION, “THE ABUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY: 
NATIONAL STUDY OF POLICE OFFICERS’ ATTITUDES” loc. 31 (2001) (online report) http://
www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weisburd-et-al.-2001-The-
Abuse-of-Police-Authority.pdf. 
17.  Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2014). 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 888. 
20.  Id. at 890. 
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an individual officer through court judgment. 
To address this practice, which fails to serve the goal of 
deterrence of lethal police misconduct, I propose excluding public 
monetary awards resulting from officer-involved homicides from 
indemnification coverage so that officers will bear sole responsibility.  
Individual liability is a necessary component in the regime of police 
reform to increase officer accountability and to decrease the number 
of officer-involved homicides of unarmed civilians each year. 
I will first discuss the current problems of lethal police violence.  
I then discuss the doctrine of indemnification.  I will then center my 
discussion on civil suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and how the 
doctrine of indemnification, as applied, undermines the goals of the 
statute as well as the goal of deterring lethal police violence, which is 
my primary concern.  I conclude by proposing my own solutions 
directed at local governments. 
 
I. Overview of the Problem of Officer-Involved 
 Homicides in the United States 
 
A central hurdle to defining the problem of officer-involved 
homicides is the lack of national and uniform reporting requirements.  
Departments currently participate in federal reporting programs on a 
voluntary basis.21  Therefore, no one knows exactly how many people 
die each year at the hands of law enforcement.  Reporting mandates 
are a key component to federal police reform.22 
The United States (U.S.) Department of Justice publishes reports 
on arrest-related deaths nation-wide.23  In the Department’s most 
recent report of data from 2003 to 2009, homicide by law enforcement 
was the leading cause of arrest-related death and increased by eight 
 
21.  Reporting mandates may accompany consent decrees resulting from 
Department of Justice investigations of unconstitutional “pattern and practices.”  42 
U.S.C. § 14141 (1994). 
22.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 8 (2015). 
23.  BURCH, supra note 9, at Fig. 1. 
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percent over the course of the reporting period.24  Regardless of the 
manner of death, 4,813 people died in the course of arrest during this 
period.25  Local governments are uniquely positioned to address this 
problem as 73.3 percent of arrest-related deaths reported to the federal 
government from 2003-2009 involved local police departments.26 
 
 A.  Officer-Involved Homicides Are a Manifestation of  
       Racism. 
 
Nationally, communities have organized protests, educational 
events, media blackouts, and occupations to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with officer-involved homicides and the lack of 
remedies, consequences, or meaningful reform.27  The existing data 
also support the public’s charges of racial inequality in arrest and 
arrest-related deaths.28  The existence of racial category in the federal 
government’s reports presupposes a racial dynamic in the tactic of 
police lethal violence.29  Racism is the ordinary means through which 
dehumanization achieves ideological normality and it is through the 
practice of dehumanizing people that produces a racial category.30  
Regardless of intent, our national policing structure results in the 
disproportionate victimization and risk of death to civilians based 
on race. 
 
24.  Id. 
25.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T1. 
26.  Id. at T17. 
27. See, e.g., Kenrya Rankin Naasel, RECAP: From #BlackLivesMatter to 
#RiseUpOctober, a Day of Protest, COLORLINES (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:51 PM) http://
www.colorlines.com/articles/recap-blacklivesmatter-riseupoctober-day-protest; 
David Nakamura & Hamil Harris, 20 Years After the Million Man March, a Fresh Call 
for Justice on the Mall, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/20-years-after-the-million-man-march-a-fresh-call-for-justice-on-the-mall/ 
2015/10/10/b3d8ffca-6f66-11e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html. 
28.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T3 (disaggregating statistics by racial categories, 
including “White, non-Hispanic;” “Black non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic,” “Other,” 
“Unknown”). 
29.  Id.  
30.  RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 243 (2007). 
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Overall, 27.8 percent of all arrests were Black people yet thirty-
one percent of the reported deaths related to arrest were Black 
victims.31  Between 2003 and 2009, 1,529 Black victims were killed during 
arrests, which amounts to about one Black person per day, giving rise to 
the popularized slogan that a Black person is killed every twenty-eight 
hours by state or local law enforcement personnel in the U.S.32  During 
the time period of this study, the national Black population was 
reportedly under thirteen percent.33  Every historical study of police use 
of fatal force has found that persons of color (principally Black males) are 
a disproportionately high percentage of the persons shot by police 
compared to their representation in the general population.34  If the 
number of Black people killed annually by law enforcement personnel is 
not alarming enough, consider the total number of victims, irrespective 
of race and/or gender.35  Black people are more likely to be killed by 
police now than they were fifty years ago.36 
 
 
31.  BURCH, supra note 9, at T3. 
32.  BURCH, supra note 9.  
33.  JESSE MCKINNON, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, 1 (2001).  It is also important 
to note that California is the leading state in arrest-related deaths, with 775 total 
reported deaths over the six-year period.  See BURCH, supra note 9. 
34.  Hubert G. Locke, The Color of Law and the Issue of Color: Race and the Abuse of 
Police Power, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF 
FORCE 129, 135 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996). 
35.  Citizen-generated databases estimated that 1,029 people were killed by law 
enforcement in 2014.  See Jay Syrmopoulus, Citizen Run Database Show over 1,000 People 
Killed by Cops in 2014, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Dec. 10, 2014), http://thefreethought
project.com/data-shows-1000-people-killed-cops-2014/.  The last report released by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics totaled 4,813 deaths in custody or during attempted 
arrests from 2003-2009.  See More than 4,800 Arrest-Related Deaths Reported from 2003 to 
2009, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Nov. 17, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/press/ard0309stpr.cfm. 
36.  Recent data estimates that police killed 238 Black people in 2014.  See Tony 
Ortega, Black Americans Killed by Police in 2014 Outnumbered Those Who Died on 9/11, 
RAW STORY (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/2015/04/black-
americans-killed-by-police-in-2014-outnumbered-those-who-died-on-911/. 
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 B.  Racism Manifested in Officer-Involved Homicides is 
       Historical. 
 
Although heightened attention to systemic police violence is 
recent, the practice is historical.  Gerald Robin’s study remarked that 
throughout several past sociological studies, “Regardless of the index 
used, then, the Negro’s tendency to be a subject of police slayings is 
excessive [noting that] for a nation as a whole the ratio of Negro to 
white rates of the victim-offender was 7 to 1, respectively.”37  A study 
conducted in Philadelphia from 1950 to 1960 found that 87.5 percent 
of the victims of homicides by police were Black while the current 
population of the city was only twenty-two percent Black.38 
In a subsequent study produced in 1974, research determined that 
the death rate for Blacks was found to be consistently nine times higher 
than for whites for the entire period of 1950-1968 in his study of police 
killings of “unarmed” civilians.39  This study suggested that the rise in 
Black victims of homicide by police is attributable to the rise in Black 
militancy and political struggle during the time period.40  One year 
later, an article on police killings in the U.S. from 1965 to 1969 based 
on the National Vital Statistics systems report combined this previous 
data and determined that Black people were killed by the police at a 
rate thirteen times higher than for whites and not the nine to ten times 
previously reported.41  The report also offered details that thirty 
percent of the civilians killed from 1965 to 1969 were not involved in 
criminal activity.  This is confirmed by a report released by the Police 
Foundation, which reveals that as many as forty percent of civilians 
killed by the police were not involved in serious criminal conduct.42  
These studies provide evidence of a history of racist and anti-Black 
 
37.  Gerald Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 223, 226 (Summer 1963). 
38.  Id. at 2. 
39.  Sid Harring, Tony Platt, Richard Speiglman & Paul Takagi, The Management 
of Police Killings, 8 CRIME & SOC. JUSTICE 34, 34 (1977). 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 36. 
42.  Id. at 39.  The Police Foundation’s mission is to advance policing through 
innovation and science.  Id.  
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policing practices in the U.S.  The ratio has increased between Black 
and white victims even while the Black American population has 
declined.43 
 C.  Officers Enjoy a Unique Level of Impunity. 
 
The police continue to kill civilians.  Officer impunity adds insult 
to injury.  Though officer-involved homicides are a daily occurrence, 
criminal prosecutions of police officers for misconduct in the line of 
duty are exceedingly rare.44  Police officers have been indicted in every 
region of the U.S. for acting under the color of law, unlawfully 
shooting the victim, and taking away his or her constitutional right 
not to be deprived of life and liberty without due process of law.  
However, federal indictments do not mean that justice has been 
obtained because all too often the police officers involved are found 
not guilty.  From 2009 to 2011, 2,716 officers throughout the U.S. faced 
allegations of excessive force.45  Of those 2,716 officers, only twenty-
eight were charged with a crime and fourteen were convicted which 
is only a 0.5 percent conviction rate.46  As evidence of historical trend, 
180 out of 228 officers indicted by the federal government between 
1971 and 1975 were acquitted.47 
These data reveal a continued pattern of protection and 
justification for officers who kill.  Impunity itself is troubling but 
becomes intolerable when data and other evidence indicate that 
 
43.  The Black U.S. population was 13.2 percent in 2012.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
THE BLACK ALONE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.census.gov/population/race/data/ppl-ba12.html.  The same year, there 
were 313 reported extrajudicial killings of Black people, amounting to one Black 
person killed every twenty-eight hours.  ARLENE EISEN, OPERATION GHETTO STORM: 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE, 
SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES 12 (2014), http://www.operationghettostorm.org/
uploads/1/9/1/1/19110795/new_all_14_11_04.pdf. 
44.  Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (1998). 
45.  David Packman, The Problem with Prosecuting Police in Washington State, 
NAT’L POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:55 AM), http://www.
policemisconduct.net/the-problem-with-prosecuting-police-in-washington-state/. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Harring et al., supra note 39, at 40. 
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officer-involved homicides are also informed by systemic racism.48  
Though they occur at different times and places, these homicides are 
similar to the extent that they are premised on the logic of anti-Black 
racism.49 
Furthermore, victims cannot defer to the existing structure of 
criminal justice when the alleged perpetrator of illegal behavior is an 
officer of the law.  Even though police officers are employees of the 
local or state government, victims’ families must turn to these same 
structures to seek justice.  This triggers distrust in the legal system, 
which is exacerbated when there are seemingly no consequences for 
officers who are responsible for the death of an unarmed civilian.  
These notions of the state as the arbiter of justice and the police as the 
unaccountable arbiters of lethal violence are two sides of the same 
coin.50 
 
II.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its Application to Local and 
  State Governments and Individual Police Officers 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the most commonly used civil cause of action 
to remedy homicides caused by police officers, therefore, it follows 
that indemnification also occurs in cases alleging unconstitutional 
conduct under § 1983 against law enforcement personnel.51  
Indemnification protects police officers from individual liability for 
monetary judgments entered against them and ensures that a 
prevailing plaintiff can collect their court-ordered judgment.52 
 
48.  Locke, supra note 34, at 137.  Hubert Locke’s research on race and police 
violence concludes that officers are more likely to use reasonable force against Blacks 
which increases the likelihood that such officers will adopt an aggressive or hostile 
approach to Black suspects but not white suspects. 
49.  Villanueva, supra note 15, at 40.  
50.  Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 2. 
51.  Martin Schwartz, Should Juries be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify 
Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1211 
(2001). 
52.  Id. 
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The Court’s jurisprudence of § 1983 has developed as tort law.53  
Therefore, tort principles determine available remedies, which 
include compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages.  
Compensatory damages are strictly provided to compensate the 
prevailing party for the injury suffered, thus these awards must 
correlate with the actual harm to the aggrieved party.54  On the 
contrary, punitive damages are awarded as retribution and 
deterrence of the offending party’s unlawful actions.55  Smith v. Wade 
held that the threshold showing for awarding punitive damages in § 
1983 cases requires that defendants be motivated by “evil motive or 
intent” or show “reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others.”56  The amounts awarded for punitive 
damages are left to the discretion of the jury or fact finder.57  
Exemplary damages are awarded when a defendant’s behavior 
results from an “evil state of mind” including recklessness or spite.58  
Exemplary damages differ from punitive awards in that they may also 
serve compensatory functions.59 
States and municipalities throughout the country frequently 
indemnify police officers to protect them from personal liability for 
monetary awards.  States such as California mandate that public 
entities defend their employees in suit and pay any “judgments, 
compromises, or settlements agreed to in the process.”60  A 2014 study 
found that approximately 9,225 civil rights cases were resolved with 
payments to plaintiffs between 2006 and 2011 in the forty-four largest 
police jurisdictions in the country.61  Of those cases, officers financially 
contributed to settlements or judgments in approximately 0.41 
 
53.  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). 
54.  James R. Mckown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14 REV. 
LITIG. 419, 422–23 (1995). 
55.  Id. 
56.  Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 
57.  Id. at 54. 
58.  Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957). 
59.  Id. at 520–21. 
60.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a) (1995). 
61.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13. 
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percent of the cases and only 0.02 percent of the total dollars paid.62  
Furthermore, no officer paid any portion of a punitive damage award 
assessed against him or her.63  A subsequent study of police 
misconduct suits confirmed that no City of Oakland police officer has 
paid settlement costs in civil rights-related cases since 1990.64  The 
information collected further evinces that the largest police 
departments in the country each paid, on average, upwards of $20 
million in settlements from 2006 to 2010.65  Indemnification shifts 
these costs from the individual officers and their respective police 
departments to cities and their resident taxpayers.  Indemnification 
thus operates to make citizens, including the victims, pay the costs of 
lethal police misconduct. 
Municipalities are specifically subject to § 1983 suits whereas the 
Eleventh Amendment gives states immunity against such suits and 
any resulting damages.66  Municipalities often indemnify officers for 
compensatory damages under § 1983.  State indemnification statutes 
regarding punitive and exemplary damages commonly require that 
the employee must (1) have acted within the scope of employment, (2) 
not have engaged in intentional, reckless, or malicious wrongdoing, 
and (3) be in the best interest of the public entity.67  All three factors 
are weighed under the “sole discretion” of the government or public 
entity.68 
Municipalities, specifically, are immune from being assessed 
punitive damages in § 1983 suits.69  However, Smith held that officers 
may be sued in their individual capacity and assessed punitive 
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 916. 
64.  Abraham Hyatt, Oakland Spent $74 Million Settling 417 Police Brutality 
Lawsuits, OAKLAND POLICE BEAT (Apr. 9, 2014), http://oaklandpolicebeat.com/2014/04/
oakland-spent-74-million-settling-417-police-brutality-lawsuits/; JOHN L. BURRIS, 
BLUE VS. BLACK: LET’S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND MINORITIES 22–23 (1999). 
65.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 912–13.  
66.  Id. at 1214; U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
67.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1217; see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b). 
68.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b). 
69.  Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). 
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damages.70  In practice, municipalities pay the cost of punitive 
damages.  However, the threshold findings required to award 
punitive damages should make an officer ineligible for 
indemnification.  A municipality’s obligation to indemnify an officer 
for punitive damages does not make the municipality the real party 
in interest, and thus does not violate the holding in Newport71 that 
municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983.72  
This precedent leaves municipalities responsible for damage awards 
that may rest primarily on punishment of the officer and not on 
compensation for the plaintiff.  Furthermore, evidence that the 
municipality may indemnify the defendant is not admissible at trial.73  
In general, federal courts exclude this information from the jury just 
as liability insurance is excluded in tort cases.74  State courts have not 
resolved whether a jury should be informed of this fact.75 
The two prominent justifications in favor of officer 
indemnification are (1) that officers will be deterred from performing 
their jobs and (2) indemnification ensures that the plaintiff will be 
made whole.  To the first claim, there is no factual basis to assert that 
law enforcement will be chilled if officers are not indemnified since 
no municipality has implemented a reform to deny indemnification 
of their officers in lawsuits for lethal use of force against unarmed 
civilians.  Though this may be a legitimate concern, studies show that 
officers rarely pay any out-of-pocket costs for their defense or to 
satisfy awards assessed against them.76  Many states require 
governments to provide officers with legal representation to defend 
claims arising from conduct or omission within the scope of officers’ 
employment, regardless of whether the department ultimately 
 
70.  Smith, 461 U.S. at 35. 
71.  Newport, 453 U.S. at 271. 
72.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220; see also Cornwell v. Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 
(1990); Bell v. Milwaukee, 536 F. Supp. 462 (1982). 
73.  Schwartz, supra note 51, at 1220. 
74.  Id. at 1229–30. 
75.  Id. at 1212. 
76.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 890. 
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indemnifies the officer.77  Available evidence indicates that law 
enforcement officers are almost always provided with defense 
counsel paid by municipalities when they are sued.78  Finally, 
refusing to perform one’s job without indemnification presupposes 
conduct that warrants litigation.  This is a reasonable expectation for 
law enforcement occupations.  However, it becomes unreasonable to 
expect indemnification in the context of litigation regarding conduct 
that rises to the level of evil that warrants punitive damages. 
The second justification that plaintiffs will not be made whole is 
the most compelling.  Yet even this justification is not wholly merited, 
for at least two reasons.  First, a plaintiff who has lost a relative due to 
an officer-involved homicide can never be made truly “whole” in the 
tortious sense, or be put back into the same position they were in 
before the incident, because the victim is deceased.  On this ground, 
the tort of wrongful death is more egregious than lesser degrees of 
injury cognizable under tort law yet offers the same remedies.  
Second, police are government agents, funded through public dollars, 
and controlled by local and state governments.  The public should all 
be uncomfortable allowing state agents whose primary mission is to 
“protect and serve” and enforce the law to commit arguably the most 
heinous crime—homicide—with no direct personal or financial 
liability. 
The California Supreme Court addressed both arguments in its 1976 
holding, in Williams v. Horvath, that state indemnification applies to 
officer defendants in § 1983 federal suits.79  The court expressly rejected 
the argument that indemnification deprives plaintiffs of their rights to 
full relief, because this would mean that governments are never liable for 
their employees’ conduct, and would actually limit plaintiffs’ recovery.80  
The Court comments, “[I]t may be argued that to permit indemnification 
would remove an effective deterrent to illegal police conduct—the 
potential of personal liability.  But in truly egregious cases the 
 
77.  Id; see, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(a) (1995). 
78.  Id. at 915.  Officer defendants are usually represented by a city attorney or 
county counsel. 
79.  16 Cal.3d. 834, 836 (1976). 
80.  Id. at 845. 
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indemnification statutes expressly forbid reimbursement by the 
entity.”81  Government indemnification or constructive indemnification 
by police unions and foundations show the opposite of this theory: near 
complete indemnification no matter the alleged conduct or judgment.  
Local governments assume entire liability for defense and fulfillment of 
awards with no responsibility resting on the individual officer whose 
conduct is the impetus of the suit. 
III.  The Legislative and Judicial History of 42 U.S.C. § 
  1983 and its Application 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes it unlawful for any person, under color of 
law, to deprive any citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the U.S. Constitution and federal and state law.82  Section 
1983 does not confer substantive rights to potential plaintiffs, but 
creates a cause of action to vindicate rights found either in the U.S. 
Constitution or federal statute.83  Section 1983 was originally enacted 
as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” to provide a remedy for civil rights 
violations inflicted by anyone acting “under the color of law.”84  
Section 1983 was passed in response to voluminous reports of Ku 
Klux Klan (“KKK”) violence and the inability of local governments to 
address it.85  Nonenforcement of the law on the state and local level 
was the main problem identified by Congress at the time of the Act’s 
passage.86  The Act was passed with the larger purpose of ensuring 
that lower governments would enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Congressman Lowe of Kansas 
expressed at the time that: 
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while 
 
81.  Id. at 848.  
82.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13) (also referred 
to as “Enforcement Act of 1871,” “Third enforcement Act,” or “Third Klu Klux Klan 
Act”). 
85.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).  
86.  Id.  
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whippings, lynching and banishing have been visited 
upon unoffending American citizens, the local 
administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling 
to apply the proper corrective measures.  Combinations, 
darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, 
wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone 
unwhipped of justice.  Immunity is given to crime and the 
records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any 
evidence of effective redress.87 
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the specific 
question of whether police officers are equally subject to § 1983 suits 
in Monroe v. Pape.88  In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that thirteen 
Chicago police officers broke into their home without a search or 
arrest warrant, made all the residents stand naked in their living 
room, ransacked their belongings, detained Plaintiff Monroe for 
questioning for ten hours without access to an attorney, then released 
Monroe with no charges.89  The Court held that acting “under color 
of” the law is interpreted as a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of 
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 
with the authority of state law.90  Since the Monroe decision held that 
police are certainly subject to suits under this provision, § 1983 suits 
have increased.91 
Subsequently, Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 
New York, addressed whether a municipality can be the subject of suit 
under § 1983.92  The Monell Court overruled the portion of Monroe that 
held that local governments are completely immune from suit under 
§ 1983.93  The Court held that local governments and officials can be 
 
87.  Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe) (quoted 
in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)). 
88.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174. 
89.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. 
90.  Id. at 184.  
91.  Sheldon H. Nahmad, Personal Viewpoint: The Mounting Attack on Section 1983 
and the 14th Amendment, 67 A.B.A. J. 1575, 1586 (1981). 
92.  436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978). 
93.  Id. at 658. 
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sued directly under § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations as a 
result of an official policy or custom which results in a “pattern or 
practice” of misconduct.94  Indemnification creates a liability 
relationship that mirrors the tort concept of respondeat superior 
between municipalities and its officers.95  Respondeat superior imposes 
vicarious liability on an employer because of the conduct or omission 
of its employee.96  However, the Supreme Court held in Monell that 
vicarious liability through respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 
suits.97 
The original 1871 Act also included provisions for harsher 
punishment when the underlying charge is a criminal offense 
including larger fines and extended prison sentences.98  In United 
States v. Harris, the Court interpreted these provisions when the State 
brought criminal conspiracy charges against Tennessee Sherriff, R. G. 
Harris, and nineteen others who removed four men from a county jail 
and subsequently beat one man to death.99  The Court held that the 
criminal provisions were unconstitutional because Congress did not 
have constitutional authority to regulate private individuals.100  Harris 
was only recently overturned in United States v. Beebe.101  In Beebe, the 
defendants were indicted under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 
2009 for conspiracy to commit a federal hate crime and the racially 
motivated harassment and assault of a developmentally disabled 
Navajo minor.102  The Court held that Congress did have authority to 
enact the criminal provisions under the power granted by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and that racially motivated violence is a 
badge and incident of slavery.103  Section 1983 was enacted to 
 
94.  Id. at 659. 
95.  Schwartz, supra note 17, at 889. 
96.  51 A.L.R. Fed. 285 § 2(a) (1981). 
97.  Monell, 436 U.S. at 707. 
98.  Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Act Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13). 
99.  U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 629–31 (1883). 
100.  Id. at 640–42. 
101.  807 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (2011). 
102.  Id. at 1047; see also 18 U.S.C. § 249 (Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009). 
103.  Beebe, 807 F. Supp 2d at 1051 & 1056. 
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counteract domestic terrorism and nonenforcement of the law, often 
perpetrated by the same person: law enforcement officers.  
Indemnification, especially in the blanket application we see today, 
undercuts the purpose of § 1983 by circumventing direct liability and 
denying citizens full protection from violence by those “acting under 
color of law.”104 
IV.   Circumvention of the Original Purpose of § 1983 
  Through Officer Indemnification 
 
Our nation has declared racism a problem of the police force 
itself, embedded in police policies and in individual officer 
discretion.105  If police are racist, and racism manifests itself in lethal 
police misconduct, officer indemnification is, in effect, the symbolic 
sanctioning of these attitudes and practices.  Officer-involved 
homicides are an auxiliary constituent of the carceral state, a revised 
practice of lynching with many of the same tenets linking racism, 
criminalization, and domestic terrorism.106 
 
 A.   Officers Involved in Lethal Misconduct Do Not Face 
    Legal Consequences. 
 
As this Note has described, officer-involved homicides 
contribute to our society’s long legacy of state terror and oppression.  
Furthermore, the legal recourse for this violence is inadequate.  
Criminal prosecution of officers is exceedingly rare, and the few that 
are charged rarely result in conviction.107  Civil suits are often the only 
way to impose legal liability on officers following a homicide.  The 
 
104.  Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174 (discussing the purpose and history of Section 1983 
to redress civil rights violations by law enforcement or failure to enforce the law by 
local law enforcement). 
105.  PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 22. 
106.  Terrorism defined as the use of violence and intimidation in pursuit of 
political aims. 
107.  Allyssa Villanueva, Police Terror and Prosecutorial Discretion, (UC 
Hastings College of the Law, working paper, 2015) (on file with author) (providing 
an overview of problems in criminal prosecution of officers and suggested solutions 
for local governments). 
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main justification for indemnification is its supposed benefit to 
plaintiffs by ensuring that the liability of insolvent officers will shift 
to municipalities whom are able to pay monetary awards.108  
However, this reduces the legitimate substantive claims of 
constitutional violations resulting in death to a mere discussion of 
money.  Indemnification contributes to the banality of police terror 
when it has the power to curtail this practice.  Indemnification, as 
applied, shields officer defendants and does nothing to shield citizens 
from the violence that gives rise to § 1983 suits.  This injustice is 
exacerbated by the low rates of criminal prosecution of officers who 
are found to have unlawfully used lethal or excessive force against 
unarmed civilians who posed no threat to them while in the line of 
duty.  Local government involvement to assist with monetary 
remedies diminishes the significance of the violation and the injury to 
the plaintiffs that often includes racism and unjust lethal violence by 
government agents. 
 
B.  The Current Application of Indemnification to § 1983 Suits  
    Does Not Serve the Goal of Deterrence. 
 
The prospect and accumulation of civil suits, unfortunately, may 
not be enough to actually deter officers or encourage governments to 
implement policies that will have such a deterrent effect.  A recent 
study found that the six police departments, constituting thirty-two 
percent of officers in the largest police departments across the 
country, do not gather or analyze information from lawsuits against 
them or their officers in any comprehensive or systematic way.109  This 
information could be used for preventative and remedial measures 
including: early identification of problematic officers with a history of 
 
108.  See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 847 (1976) (holding that 
indemnification does not frustrate purpose of § 1983 but rather furthers the purpose 
by ensuring that Plaintiffs can recover from Defendants and that municipalities can 
be liable). 
109.  Joanna Schwartz, Myth & Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law 
Enforcement Decision-making, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1045 (2010). 
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misconduct or complaints, identification of patterns & trends, and 
investigation of claims made in lawsuits. 
Furthermore, individuals charged under § 1983, who are not 
officers of the law, do not have the benefit of an agency to indemnify 
their awards.  Such defendants must bear the total brunt of the 
liability.  Indemnification creates a more favorable outcome for officer 
defendants compared to civilian defendants for the same violation.  
This “privilege” available to officer defendants is unsettling because 
officers are currently subject to § 1983 more frequently than 
civilians.110  Blanket indemnification results in no legal accountability, 
criminal or civil, to individual officers engaged in misconduct.  There 
are countless examples of officers, chiefs, and other officials who have 
revealed deep-seated racist beliefs and attitudes.111 
 
C.  The Current Law Enforcement Regime is Directly  
    Connected to a Legacy of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. 
 
The KKK is arguably the most well-known domestic terrorist 
organization in the U.S.112  The KKK was directly responsible for the 
systematic perpetration of centuries of racialized domestic terror, 
inflicted upon African Americans, in particular.113  Reports estimate 
that countless police departments across the country actively 
participated in at least fifty percent of documented lynchings in the 
U.S. between 1880 and 1950, and passively condoned a majority of the 
rest.114  An important and ironic dynamic of this history of state-
sponsored violence is the commonly known fact that many KKK 
 
110.  Nahmad, supra note 91. 
111.  See, e.g., Associated Press, 7 San Francisco Officers Suspended over Racist Texts, 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/03/cops-racist-text-sus
pend_n_7001580.html (Apr. 4, 2015, 8:59 AM). 
112.  Extremist Files: Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.
splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Robert A. Gibson, The Negro Holocaust: Lynching and Race Riots in the United 
States, 1800-1950, YALE NEW HAVEN TEACHERS INST. (2015), http://www.yale. 
edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/2/79.02.04.x.html.  
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members and participants in these high-profile, coordinated, and 
widely celebrated acts of terrorism were in fact, distinguished 
members of the law enforcement community.  Officers were routinely 
complicit in refusing to charge known KKK terrorists, to vindicate its 
victims, and allowing mobs and terror groups to forcefully take 
victims from police custody.  Concerned citizens and hate-tracking 
organizations, like the Southern Poverty Law Center, have discovered 
officers belonging to the KKK or other hate groups that conflict with 
the mission of police departments.115  Most police departments do not 
currently screen officers for hate group affiliation.116  These facts 
intensify the demand for equal policing that is free of racism and 
discrimination. 
For a nation-state like the U.S., sovereignty means the capacity to 
define who matters and who dies.117  In a local context, police are 
given that power of discretion.  Licensed by law, the mere capacity of 
the police for vicious and “irrational” violence is an important part of 
the state’s repressive apparatus, regardless of statistical frequency.118  
The willingness of the police to kill people exerts a control power far 
beyond any statistical measure of the actual incidence of police 
killings.119  Even with statistical measure, victims are unequal along 
racial lines. 
 
V.   Proposed Reform at the Local Government Level to  
 Deter Lethal Use of Force 
 
The objectives of this proposed reform are deterrence and 
 
115.  Allie Jones, This Florida Police Department Can’t Stop Hiring KKK Members, 
GAWKER (July 14, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://gawker.com/two-alleged-kkk-members-fired-
from-florida-police-depar-1604795204.  
116.  Renee Lewis, No Police Screening for KKK, Hate Group Membership, Florida 
Case Shows, AL JAZEERA (July 15, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://america.aljazeera.
com/articles/2014/7/14/kkk-florida-police.html. 
117.  Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 11 (Translated by Libby 
Mientjes, 2003). 
118.  Harring, et al., supra note 39, at 42. 
119.  Id.  
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punishment.  At the least, municipal governments should not 
indemnify punitive awards based on officer misconduct, because the 
awards are based solely on findings of egregious misconduct and 
imposed for the purpose of punishment, not compensation.  Complete 
non-indemnification of officers in any suit resulting from lethal 
misconduct (as opposed to nonlethal) is needed from employing 
agencies to deter lethal use of force policies and practice.  A strict policy 
will force officers to not just think about the potential of civil suit but 
also the possibility of personal liability for monetary awards. 
Prosecutorial discretion and internal investigations following 
officer-involved homicides demonstrate an unwillingness to 
criminally charge officers causing current national controversy.  As 
discussed in Part IV, arguments that without indemnification people 
will not become officers or that officers cannot perform their jobs are 
unpersuasive.  Furthermore, direct personal liability for civil awards 
puts an extreme financial burden on the officer(s) based on the fact 
that awards can reach millions of dollars.  It is unlikely that officers 
will bear the burden alone.  Police culture has created an ironclad 
system of moral, political, and financial support from police unions, 
foundations, and the larger American public.120  Many of these 
organizations use their power to fund attorneys and support 
campaigns for officers.  The National Police Misconduct Statistics and 
Reporting Project estimates that civil litigation related to police 
misconduct cost $72 billion in 2009 alone.121  Simple exposure to civil 
liability requires minimal reform effort with a potential for high 
societal impact.  Local governments should not be in the business of 
indemnifying punitive awards by definition of the degree of conduct 
required to warrant punitive damages.  Furthermore, local 
governments can use their statutory discretion to refuse to indemnify 
 
120.  See, e.g., online fundraising campaigns for Officer Darren Wilson who was 
acquitted by a jury at trial for death of 18-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri; Carolyn M. Brown, Over $500,000 in Crowd Funding Raised for Ferguson Officer 
Darren Wilson, BLACK ENTER. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.blackenterprise.com/news/
over-500000-raised-for-ferguson-officer-darren-wilson-before-sites-shut-down/. 
121.  National Police Misconduct Statistics and Reporting Project, 2009 Quarterly Q2 
Report, CATO INST., http://www.policemisconduct.net/statistics/quarterly-q2-2009/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
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officers in the specific class of cases involving the use of lethal force. 
In the narrow case of officer-involved homicides, civil law 
reduces the violation to a mere tort that seeks to compensate victims 
and their families, rather than punish or deter the defendant.  This 
effectively devalues citizens’ lives; a value that is not even paid by the 
officer(s) responsible.  Personal liability will strengthen deterrence.  
Deterrence is furthered by the threat of contempt of court proceedings 
if an officer refuses to pay a civil award.  While state laws differ, 
contempt of court generally refers to the disobedience of any lawful 
judgment or order of the court.122  The penalties for contempt of court 
vary and may include: jail time, community service, fines, and 
attorney fees.123  Direct liability for civil damages may lead to other 
punitive measures if officers fail to take responsibility under court 
order. 
When police and their supporters feel the true weight of the 
millions of dollars that are assessed in damages and settlements each 
year against municipalities for lethal officer misconduct, they might 
re-consider their position on the issue.  Officers will certainly 
consider whether their discretion to use lethal force in the field is 
worth the risk to their personal finances with knowledge that their 
City will not indemnify them in suit.  This shift of thinking from “Can 
I use lethal force?” to “Should I use lethal force?” will save countless 
lives.  Cities will also have more money available to fund any number 
of other critical expenditures.  It is true that non-indemnification will 
leave some successful plaintiffs without payment or delayed 
payment.  Arguments for liability that turn on compensation shift the 
focus away from the structural issue of officer-involved homicides to 
monetary awards and a party’s ability to pay.  Individual victim 
compensation does not address the structural problems of policing 
that this Note intends to address. 
Indemnification effectively circumvents individual liability that 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to impose.  Victims are left without the 
 
122.  See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1209(a); La. Code of Civ. Proc. § 221 et seq.; 
N.Y. Code § 2308; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571–81. 
123.  17 C.J.S. Contempt § 5 (2015).  
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legal right to life and liberty, and their families are left without an 
institution to provide them with justice.  The law, clothed in the ethic 
of impunity, is simply contingent on the repetition of its own 
violence.124  The least that local governments can do to remedy the 
historical trajectory of racist and anti-Black state violence is not 
indemnify its officers in cases involving homicide, especially when a 
court finds the officer’s misconduct is as egregious or evil as to meet 
the higher standard required for punitive damages. 
Each officer should be held individually liable for such civil 
awards.  States such as California grant sole discretion to the public 
agency of whether to fulfill punitive or exemplary damages.125  
Furthermore, all states have an exemption for memorandum of 
understandings (“MOUs”).126  The terms of an MOU are bargained 
for between the police union and the municipality.  These are a few 
of the opportunities for municipalities to limit their liability to satisfy 
awards based on officer misconduct. 
Conclusion 
American society does not yet function as an idyllic state in 
which all vestiges of racism, oppression, and malicious deprivation 
of constitutional rights have been eliminated.127  When police kill, the 
shock of the violence and the weight of the resulting awards are 
absorbed by local governments and their taxpayers.  However, it is 
the local governments who are generally empowered to impose 
direct consequences on their officers and best situated to address the 
problems raised in this Note. 
The individual officers who are the perpetrators of lethal 
violence and defendants in subsequent suits face no personal stake in 
the current regime of civil legal remedies.  Criminal liability is even 
more of a rarity imposed on individual officers.  Racism exists at the 
individual, interpersonal, and structural levels of society.  No form 
 
124.  Martinot & Sexton, supra note 7, at 8. 
125.  See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 825(b) (1995). 
126.  See supra Part I.C. for an in-depth discussion of officer impunity.  
127.  Williams, 16 Cal. 3d at 841. 
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of jurisprudence, civil or criminal, has been successful in imposing 
individual accountability for the citizen’s life prematurely ended by 
police violence.  Current remedies and suggested policy reforms are 
consistently structural.  Reform must be instated at every level and 
indemnification limitations must be aimed at the individual and 
interpersonal level of this systemic violence. 
 
 
  
